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STAND IN THE PLACE WHERE
DATA LIVE: DATA BREACHES AS
ARTICLE III INJURIES
JASON S. WASSERMAN*
INTRODUCTION
In the first six months of 2019, organizations suffered over 3,800
data breaches, up fifty-four percent from 2018.1 Unsurprisingly, identity
theft is America’s fastest-growing crime.2 Hackers who coordinate
cyberattacks stand to gain significant wealth by either misusing data or
selling it to hostile parties, leaving victims vulnerable to fraudulent use
of their data.3 In July 2019, for example, Capital One suffered a breach
in which a hacker gained access to approximately 100 million credit
card accounts and applications in the United States, including social
security and bank account numbers.4 The Capital One breach likely
affected anyone who applied for a credit card in any year from 2005
through 2019.5
To respond to data breaches, harmed consumers have some
recourse available. The hacker behind a data breach—assuming he or
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1. James Sanders, Data Breaches Increased 54% in 2019 So Far, TECHREPUBLIC (Aug. 15,
2019, 7:35 A.M.), https://www.techrepublic.com/article/data-breaches-increased-54-in-2019-sofar/.
2. United States Postal Inspection Service, Identity Theft, UNITED STATES POSTAL
INSPECTION SERV. TIPS & PREVENTION, https://www.uspis.gov/tips-prevention/identity-theft/
(last visited Dec. 8, 2019).
3. Thomas Brewster, Hackers Behind A 770 Million Mega Leak Are Selling 10 Times More
Data—But Don’t Panic, FORBES (Jan. 21, 2019, 6:36 A.M.), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/thomasbrewster/2019/01/21/hackers-who-leaked-collection-1-are-selling-10-times-moredata-but-you-dont-need-to-panic/#7aeaed477c15; Arjun Kharpal, Hackers Are Selling Your Data
on the ‘Dark Web’ . . . For Only $1, CNBC (Sept. 23, 2015, 11:15 A.M.),
https://www.cnbc.com/2015/09/23/hackers-are-selling-your-data-on-the-dark-web-for-1.html.
4. Information on the Capital One Cyber Incident, CAPITAL ONE, https://www.capital
one.com/facts2019/ (last updated Sept. 23, 2019, 4:15 P.M.).
5. Id.
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she can actually be found—will likely face federal or state criminal
liability and may be forced to pay restitution.6 But a compromised
organization entrusted with the information may also be at fault for
facilitating or allowing the unauthorized data exposure, and victims
often turn to federal class action suits against such organizations to
seek redress.7 These data breach lawsuits are growing in number each
year as more data breaches affect more consumers.8
Courts, however, do not even agree on whether or when data
breach victims can sue, or in other words, when the victims suffer
cognizable legal injuries that create Article III standing.9 To many
courts, plaintiff-victims cannot sue until they prove that they were
already, or are absolutely about to be, victims of a subsequent injury
occurring long after the original data breach, such as identity theft.10
Courts differ in defining how much apparent or actual subsequent
harm is sufficient for standing, but none to date have held that a data
breach alone, regardless of subsequent harm, can cause a cognizable
common law injury. The Third Circuit has come the closest, holding that
a data breach may cause an inherently cognizable injury when a federal
statute is implicated. But no court has extended that approach to state
statutory or common law claims.11 The current array of approaches is
based largely on differing interpretations of Clapper v. Amnesty
International USA, a 2013 Supreme Court case where a class of

6. E.g., Equifax Data Breach Settlement, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jan. 2020),
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/refunds/equifax-data-breach-settlement;
United States Dep’t of Justice Off. of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Charges Russian FSB Officers and Their
Criminal Conspirators for Hacking Yahoo and Millions of Email Accounts, UNITED STATES
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-russian-fsb-officersand-their-criminal-conspirators-hacking-yahoo-and-millions.
7. See David Balser et al., INSIGHT: Data Breach Litigation Trends to Watch ¶ 10,
BLOOMBERG LAW (Mar. 4, 2019, 4:01 A.M.), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacy-and-datasecurity/insight-data-breach-litigation-trends-to-watch (“Some of the most noteworthy data
breach litigation developments in 2018 were large consumer class action [data breach]
settlements.”).
8. See id. (“[T]he scale of litigation and regulatory investigations directed towards data
security will continue to expand.”).
9. See infra Part II (discussing circuit split).
10. See, e.g., In re U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 928 F.3d 42, 58–59, 75
(D.C. Cir. 2019) (discussing cases from other circuits and ultimately finding that plaintiffs had
standing); Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 273 (4th Cir. 2017) (“Our sister circuits are divided
on whether a plaintiff may establish an Article III injury-in-fact based on an increased risk of
future identity theft. The Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have all recognized, at the pleading
stage, that plaintiffs can establish an injury-in-fact based on this threatened injury . . . . By
contrast, the First and Third Circuits have rejected such allegations.”).
11. See infra Parts II.A and II.B (reviewing circuit courts that have found plaintiffs have
standing for data breach lawsuits).
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individuals alleged that they would be wiretapped by the federal
government. In Clapper, the plaintiffs did not have standing because
the alleged wiretapping was not “certainly impending” and, even more,
because those plaintiffs had relied on a chain of speculative
assumptions.12 Some courts have used this precedent in data breach
cases to refuse to find standing when plaintiff-victims only allege that
because of a data breach, they face an increased risk of, rather than
already-occurred instance of, misuse of their personal information.13 In
part, the refusals to find standing are because fraud or other harm
following a data breach may take years to manifest and will affect an
uncertain number of people.14
This Note argues for a different approach from any currently
articulated by courts: that data breach victims suffer inherently
cognizable legal injuries the moment that their information is disclosed
without their consent. A data breach itself, without allegations of future
misuse of personal information, generally creates a common law injury.
This approach is proper even when a data breach does not lead to
subsequent harm. Data breaches fit neatly into the framework of longrecognized privacy torts in which damages are presumed. Data breach
victims may also have standing under breach of contract theories. To
that end, it is inappropriate to apply Clapper to data breach suits
because a data breach is generally an adverse event that has already
occurred, not a wholly speculative future occurrence. Although
enactment of a federal data privacy statute would certainly alleviate
standing questions that plaintiff-victims face, there is simply no need
for such legislation for standing purposes alone. In essence, if a data
breach case is dismissed because the plaintiff-victims fail to plead what
are, in effect, meritorious claims, that determination should be under
Rule 12(b)(6), at summary judgment, or after trial. Suits should not be
dismissed under the false idea that the plaintiff-victims did not suffer
cognizable legal injuries.
Holding that data breach plaintiff-victims have standing is
consistent with the doctrine of standing. Standing is a separation of
12. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409–10 (2013).
13. See infra Part II.C (discussing the third approach in which courts find that plaintiffs do
not have standing).
14. See, e.g., Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 45 (3d. Cir. 2011) (discussing the “entirely
speculative” nature of alleged data misuse); Lily Hay Newman, The WIRED Guide to Data
Breaches ¶ 4, WIRED (Dec. 7, 2018, 9:00 A.M.), https://www.wired.com/story/wired-guide-todata-breaches/ (“Even after a data breach has occurred, though, and an unauthorized actor
definitely has your data, you won’t necessarily see an immediate negative impact.”).
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powers principle initially articulated in the early 1920s15 that ensures
courts do not usurp powers of the political branches of the United
States government.16 Essentially, courts decide specific disputes before
them about distinct injuries17 and cannot rule on hypothetical
questions. Otherwise, courts would be legislating for future scenarios,
thereby infringing the powers reserved to Congress.18 However, data
breach lawsuits pose no such risk. They are based on a past controversy
in which victims’ information was disclosed without their authorization,
and any future harm, such as identity theft, stems from that past event;
no conjecture is needed, at least for determining whether victims did in
fact suffer harm.19 Determining the alleged risk of future harm
following a data breach is not a question of standing but rather of
causation and damages: whether the alleged risk of future harm is
proximately tied to the data breach and to what degree the data breach
ultimately harmed plaintiffs.20 For this reason, courts should find that
data breach incidents, alleged future harm from them, and costs to
mitigate that future harm are sufficient injuries to satisfy standing
requirements. Otherwise, victims of data breaches may not even be let
into court to adjudicate liability.
In this Note, Part I provides a relevant background on Article III
standing. Part II surveys and analyzes the current circuit split over
whether and when data breach plaintiffs have standing. Part II also
organizes the current approaches to standing into three categories.
Then, Part III sets out the Note’s main argument, which is that those
three existing approaches to standing are improper. And so, Part III

15. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) (“The party who invokes the
[judicial] power must be able to show, not only that the statute is invalid, but that he has sustained
or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and
not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.”); Fairchild
v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129 (1922) (“Plaintiff’s alleged interest in the question submitted is not
such as to afford a basis for this proceeding. It is frankly a proceeding to have the Nineteenth
Amendment declared void.”).
16. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 408–09.
17. See John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219,
1224–25 (1993) (discussing how conjectural, hypothetical, or possible future harm does not meet
Article III standing requirements).
18. See id. (“We accept the judiciary’s displacement of the democratically elected branches
when necessary to decide an actual case.”).
19. Jennifer M. Joslin, The Path to Standing: Asserting the Inherent Injury of the Data Breach,
2019 UTAH L. REV. 735, 749 (2019) (“[A standing] inquiry is unnecessary when courts recognize
an injury based on the theft of plaintiffs’ personal information, irrespective of potential fraudulent
misuse of that information.”).
20. In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir. 2018); Remijas v. Nieman Marcus
Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 696 (7th Cir. 2015).
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then sets out a “fourth” and proper approach to data breach standing.
That is, plaintiffs have federal standing under common law the moment
that a data breach occurs. Such immediate standing is appropriate for
two primary reasons. First is that data breaches constitute tortious
violations of privacy where injuries and damages may be presumed.
Second is that data breaches may be violations of obligations to protect
data, which are grounded in contract law. Part III then asserts that,
because data breaches are in and of themselves injurious, Clapper’s
“imminence” test for standing does not apply to data breach lawsuits.
Finally, Part IV provides policy arguments that support finding that
plaintiffs have standing in these cases.
I. ARTICLE III STANDING & RISK OF FUTURE HARM
To litigate in federal courts, a plaintiff must satisfy the constitutional
requirement of Article III standing.21 Standing is grounded in
separation of powers principles and ensures that federal courts
adjudicate primarily “[c]ases” or “[c]ontroversies.”22 In other words,
federal courts may only resolve actual, ongoing disputes between
parties.23 If courts decided questions where no actual controversy
existed, they would be “making law” broadly over hypothetical
situations, usurping the other federal branches’ power.24
In practice, standing depends on whether the plaintiff has suffered
a cognizable legal injury,25 which rests on three elements. The plaintiff’s
alleged injury must be an “injury in fact,”26 “fairly traceable to the
challenged action,” and “redressable” by a favorable court ruling.27 The
most important of these elements is establishing the existence of an
injury in fact.28 If the plaintiff cannot show they suffered an injury in
21. Standing is a separate doctrine from Rule 8 pleading standards. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 500 (1975) (“Although standing in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiffs’ contention
that particular conduct is illegal, it often turns on the nature and source of the claim alleged.”);
Wilding v. DNC Servs. Corp., 941 F.3d 1116, 1128 (11th Cir. 2019) (“Whether a plaintiff has
Article III standing is a question distinct from whether she has a statutory cause of action.”).
22. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
23. Patrick J. Lorio, Note, Access Denied: Data Breach Litigation, Article III Standing, & A
Proposed Statutory Solution, 51 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 79, 83 (2017) (citing Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)).
24. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013).
25. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992) (discussing injuries that
create standing as “legally cognizable injuries”).
26. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548–49 (2016).
27. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409.
28. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547 (calling establishment of an injury in fact the “first and
foremost” element of standing).

WASSERMAN FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

206

4/21/2020 10:46 AM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

[VOL. 15

fact, traceability and redressability need not be analyzed.29 Whether an
injury in fact exists requires that the alleged harm is (1) particularized,
(2) concrete, and (3) actual or imminent.30
A. Particularized
An injury is particularized when it affects the plaintiff as a person
and individual, rather than as an angry third-party or public observer.31
A suit to enforce the invasion of a private right, like trespass,
presumably passes muster; such private rights inherently belong to
individuals.32 However, a plaintiff cannot bring a suit to enforce a right
in the general public interest without also alleging how he or she was
personally harmed.33 For example, a plaintiff cannot sue a government
agency for failing to follow a regulation merely because the violation
harmed the “public at large.”34 Even when a community in aggregate
might practically be affected by a government’s regulatory violation, a
plaintiff still must demonstrate he or she was personally injured.35 In
data breach cases, a plaintiff’s ability to show a particularized injury has
not historically been an issue.
B. Concrete
Concreteness entails an independent inquiry into whether an injury
is “real, and not abstract,” or that it practically and actually exists.36
Concreteness, as the Supreme Court most recently explained in
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,37 hinges on both historical practice and whether

29. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (“Since they are not mere pleading requirements but rather
an indispensable part of the plaintiff’s case, each element must be supported in the same way as
any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree
of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” (emphasis in original)).
30. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548–49.
31. Id. at 1548.
32. See id. at 1551 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“In a suit for the violation of a private right,
courts historically presumed that the plaintiff suffered a de facto injury merely from having his
personal, legal rights invaded. Thus, when one man placed his foot on another’s property, the
property owner needed to show nothing more to establish a traditional case or controversy.”
(emphasis in original)).
33. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–74 (“We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a
generally available grievance about government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s
interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly
and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large—does not state an Article III case or
controversy.”).
34. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1551–52 (Thomas, J., concurring).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1548–49 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
37. Id. at 1548–50.
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Congress defined a particular right via statute.38 And, although a
tangible injury like physical harm is quickly recognized as concrete, an
injury need not be tangible to be concrete. For example, violations of
constitutional free speech and free exercise rights are concrete
injuries.39 Similarly, if a statute mandates that certain information be
publicly available, and individuals cannot obtain that information, a
concrete harm exists.40
Recently, the Supreme Court in Spokeo laid out a framework for
determining the concreteness of injuries for statutory violations.41 In
Spokeo, a “people search engine” named Spokeo, Inc. had disseminated
information about the plaintiff, Thomas Robins, that was allegedly
inaccurate.42 Robins subsequently sued Spokeo under the federal Fair
Credit Reporting Act, theorizing that his statutory right to handle his
credit reporting information was violated.43 Initially, the district court
dismissed Robins’s suit for a lack of standing, but the Ninth Circuit later
found that Robins did have standing because he suffered an
individualized and particularized harm.44 However, the Supreme Court
ultimately held that the Ninth Circuit’s analysis was incomplete
because it had failed to consider the “concreteness” of Robins’s alleged
injury, and so the Court remanded the case for a new and full standing
analysis.45 Under Spokeo, Congress may, via statute, create new
cognizable legal injuries,46 but a bare procedural violation may result in
no actual harm. Therefore, a plaintiff does not automatically show
concrete injuries every time a statute is violated.47 Courts must take
care to examine a plaintiff’s theory of harm.

38. Id. at 1549.
39. Id.
40. Id. (citing Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20–25 (1998)).
41. Id. at 1550.
42. Id. at 1544.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1544–45.
45. Id. at 1545.
46. Id. at 1549 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992)) (“Congress
may ‘elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were
previously inadequate in law.’” (emphasis in original)); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 514 (1975)
(“Congress may create a statutory right or entitlement the alleged deprivation of which can confer
standing to sue even where the plaintiff would have suffered no judicially cognizable injury in the
absence of statute.”).
47. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (“Congress’ role in identifying and elevating intangible harms
does not mean that a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a
statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate
that right.”).
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After the Supreme Court remanded Spokeo for the Ninth Circuit
to reconsider standing, the Ninth Circuit offered one possible
interpretation of the Supreme Court’s framework using a two-part test.
First, courts must ask whether Congress established the statute in
question to protect concrete interests, as opposed to merely procedural
rights; and second, if the answer to the first question is affirmative,
courts must check whether the violation in question harms or presents
a risk of material harm to those concrete interests.48 Notably, the
Supreme Court in Spokeo also confirmed that the mere “risk of real
harm” could be one such concrete injury.49 Spokeo thus provides insight
into how courts should examine data breach cases. The concreteness of
an alleged injury, and therefore standing, depends largely on which
injuries a plaintiff alleges, congressional purposes for any statutory
provision in question, and the nature of common law rights violated.50
C. Actual or Imminent
Finally, an alleged injury must be “actual or imminent.”51 That is,
the alleged injury must have already occurred, be ongoing, or, if an
injury is alleged to be in the future, it must be more than just
“possible.”52 This requirement is particularly relevant in data breach
cases when allegations include the risk of future identity theft. In
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, the Supreme Court outlined
when an injury might be actual or imminent.53 Clapper’s facts differ
from those of data breach cases, but it is nonetheless an important case
because some circuit courts choose to rely on it in data breach suits.
In Clapper, a group representing human rights, labor, legal, and
media organizations challenged the constitutionality of Section 702 of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.54 Section 702 authorized the
United States to undertake warrantless wiretapping for foreign
intelligence purposes.55 The plaintiffs sued the United States before

48. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[W]e thus ask: (1) whether
the statutory provisions at issue were established to protect his concrete interests (as opposed to
purely procedural rights), and if so, (2) whether the specific procedural violations alleged in this
case actually harm, or present a material risk of harm to, such interests.”). Ultimately, the Ninth
Circuit found that Robins had standing. Id. at 1118.
49. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (emphasis added).
50. Id. at 1549–50.
51. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 401, 408–09.
54. Id. at 401, 406–07.
55. Id. at 403.
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actually having their communications intercepted and merely alleged
there was an “objectively reasonable likelihood” that their
communications would be acquired “at some point in the future.”56 The
Supreme Court held the plaintiffs lacked standing.57 The plaintiffs had
no knowledge that the government had “targeted” their particular
communications, nor was there any past occurrence of harm.58
Accordingly, the plaintiffs had not suffered actual or imminent harm
but merely unsubstantiated fears.59
The Court explained that the imminence requirement for an injury
in fact is “a somewhat elastic concept,” but an alleged future injury
cannot be stretched so far to be wholly speculative.60 If so, claims of risk
of future injury, or preventative measures to address thereof, are
insufficient.61 The Supreme Court obliquely described two potential
standards for claimed future harms to satisfy the imminence
requirement. The first and stricter standard is that an injury must be
“certainly impending.”62 The second potential standard, however,
merely requires plaintiffs to show a “substantial risk” that harm will
occur, even when it may not be certain that harm will ever come
about.63 Under either potential standard, plaintiffs cannot simply allege
an “attenuated chain of inferences” that lead to some future harm.64
It is not clear when exactly the “substantial risk” standard applies,
even to circuit courts that have split on how to understand Clapper’s
framework. In part, the uncertainty is because the Court discussed the
possibility that the two standards are not entirely separate.65 The Court
stated that “[i]n some instances, we have found standing based on a
‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur, which may prompt plaintiffs
to reasonably incur costs to mitigate or avoid that harm.”66 But “to the
extent that the ‘substantial risk’ standard is relevant and is distinct from

56. Id. at 407.
57. Id. at 420, 422.
58. Id. at 410.
59. Id. at 420, 422.
60. Id. at 409 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 565 n.2 (1992))
(“Although imminence is concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond
its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III
purposes—that the injury is certainly impending.” (emphasis in original)).
61. Id. at 401, 409.
62. Id. at 401.
63. Id. at 414 n.5.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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the ‘clearly impending’ requirement, respondents fall short.”67 The
Clapper Court applied the “certainly impending” standard, but
application to other areas of law is uncertain. The data breach circuit
split is in part over whether Clapper governs those cases and, if so,
which standard applies.
II. CURRENT APPROACHES TO DATA BREACH STANDING
Circuit courts have split on when plaintiffs bringing claims
following data breaches have standing.68 The split concerns whether—
and how much—an increased risk of future harm following a data
breach is an injury in fact sufficient for standing. Different circuits
utilize one of three contrasting approaches. However, each approach is
analytically improper in virtually all data breach cases. Even when
courts have determined that data breach plaintiff-victims have
standing, which is the correct result, the means and reasoning under
which they do so are improper. And so, this Note suggests in Part III a
fourth approach not currently endorsed by any court.
The first approach is that a data breach may constitute an “actual”
injury but only when plaintiffs bring claims under a federal statute.
Under this approach, Clapper need not apply, and it is unnecessary to
evaluate the imminence of future harm.69 The second approach is a
lenient standard of “substantial risk” analysis: A data breach victim
may have suffered an injury in fact because, although plaintiffs must
show they face subsequent imminent harm, that bar is low.70 Third is
that a data breach alone is not evidence of an injury: A plaintiff must
show conclusively that a given data breach has led to looming or actual
identity theft, fraud, blackmail, or other harm.71
A. First Approach: A Data Breach Can Be Inherently Injurious
The first approach, currently adopted by only the Third Circuit, is
that data breach plaintiffs might have standing for actual injuries if a

67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 80 (1st Cir. 2012) (“The courts of appeals
have evidenced some disarray about the applicability of this sort of ‘increased risk’ theory in data
privacy cases.”).
69. To date, this first approach has only been advanced by the Third Circuit. In re Horizon
Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 629, 640 (3d Cir. 2017).
70. To date, this second approach has been followed at least once by the Fourth, Sixth,
Seventh, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits. See infra Part II.B.
71. To date, this third approach has been followed at least once by the Second, Third, Fourth,
Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits. See infra Part II.C.
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federal statute is implicated. In In re Horizon Healthcare Services, the
Third Circuit held that being the victim of a data breach can be an
injury in and of itself, sufficient for standing, if the cause of action is
under a federal statute like the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970
(“FCRA”).72 The majority opinion did not cite Clapper.73 Instead, the
court relied on Spokeo, noting that Congress has the power to define
injuries with legislation, in which case a substantive statutory violation
constitutes cognizable harm.74 In Horizon, thieves stole two laptops
containing credit card information from a health insurer.75 Plaintiffs
brought suit under FCRA, which requires that consumer reporting
organizations take reasonable steps to ensure the accuracy and
integrity of consumer information.76 The court found that the plaintiffs
had standing regardless of whether the disclosure of information would
cause future harm because the plaintiffs alleged “unauthorized
dissemination of their own private information—the very injury that
FCRA is intended to prevent.”77 That is, “[e]ven without evidence that
the Plaintiffs’ information was in fact used improperly, the alleged
disclosure of their personal information created a de facto injury.”78
The court compared data breaches to privacy torts in explaining
why a FCRA violation was inherently an injury in fact. The court
explained that “with privacy torts, improper dissemination of
information can itself constitute a cognizable injury.”79 That invasion of
privacy, which is an intangible harm, “has traditionally been regarded
as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts.”80
Congress, in enacting FCRA, sought to protect against injuries closely
related to that long-recognized intangible harm, so a substantive FCRA
violation was inherently sufficient for standing.81
The Third Circuit subsequently clarified the Horizon holding. For
plaintiffs to have de facto standing under a federal statute, they must
allege that the statute in question protects rights “of the same character
as a previously existing” injury.82 In a data breach case, that means the
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

The Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 1681–1681x (2018).
Horizon, 846 F.3d at 634.
Id. at 638, 640.
Id. at 630.
Id. at 631.
Id. at 640.
Id. at 629.
Id. at 638–39.
Id. at 639–40 (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016)).
Id.
Kamal v. J. Crew Grp., Inc., 918 F.3d 102, 114 (3d Cir. 2019).
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statute must protect against the unauthorized disclosure of personal
information to a third party.83
The Horizon court also limited this standing approach to federal
statutory violations because common law claims were not at issue.84 The
court stated that despite its discussion of privacy torts, it was “not
suggesting that Horizon’s actions would give rise to a cause of action
under common law.”85 In particular, “[n]o common law tort proscribes
the release of truthful information that is not harmful to one’s
reputation or otherwise offensive.”86 However, even if Horizon had
involved common law claims, it is unlikely that the Third Circuit would
have held differently. Several years before Horizon, the Third Circuit
held in a different data breach case that plaintiffs who brought common
law claims did not have standing.87 Examining the Third Circuit’s cases
together, it is left open, albeit unlikely, that the court might consider a
data breach as creating a de facto injury under common law.
B. Second Approach: Proving Imminence is a Low Bar
Second, other courts have found standing for another reason: that
although data breach plaintiffs must still demonstrate that subsequent
future harm is imminent, the burden is low.88 These courts use the
“substantial risk” standard from Clapper and generally find that
plaintiffs face a substantial risk of identity theft or fraud as soon as
hackers hold stolen information, regardless of whether the claims are
statutory or under common law.89 Pursuant to this approach, there is
“no need to speculate”90 whether plaintiffs have standing because of
the “obvious potential” for misuse of stolen data.91 As the Seventh

83. Id.
84. See Horizon, 846 F.3d at 639–40 (discussing statutory, rather than common law, harms
and explicitly denying that the opinion’s standing analysis necessarily applies to common law
claims).
85. Id. at 639.
86. Id.
87. Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011).
88. E.g., Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 622 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Remijas v. Nieman
Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig.,
66 F. Supp. 3d. 1197, 1214 (N.D. Cal. 2014)).
89. Although these courts take a variety of approaches, what they hold in common is that
plaintiffs have standing when they allege that a data breach caused them an increased risk of
future harm. E.g., In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1024, 1027–28 (9th Cir. 2018); Attias, 865
F.3d at 628–29; Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x. 384, 388 (6th Cir. 2016).
90. Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693.
91. In re U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 928 F.3d 42, 58, 60 (D.C. Cir.
2019).
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Circuit noted, “[w]hy else would hackers break into a store’s database
and steal consumers’ private information?”92 The purpose of a hack is
presumably to sooner or later commit a fraudulent act, leading to a
clear risk of harm.93 This approach tends to find that plaintiffs have
standing, which is the correct result. But the approach still examines
whether plaintiffs will suffer injuries subsequent to the data breach,
which is improper reasoning.
For example, the Sixth Circuit in Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual held
that plaintiffs had standing for FCRA violations and common law
claims because there was imminence of future harm as soon as the
plaintiffs’ information was “in the hands of ill-intentioned criminals.”94
In Galaria, hackers breached Nationwide, a large insurance and
financial services company.95 The Sixth Circuit found that the plaintiffs
had standing despite that it was not “literally certain” the plaintiffs’
data would be misused.96 Similarly, in Remijas v. Neiman Marcus, the
Seventh Circuit found that the plaintiff had standing following a breach
of Neiman Marcus, a luxury department store. The court found that the
plaintiffs had standing because “the risk that Plaintiffs’ personal data
will be misused by the hackers . . . is immediate and very real.”97
Additionally, some of the plaintiffs had already suffered fraudulent
charges on their credit cards by the time of the lawsuit,98 which helped
indicate that those who had not yet faced fraudulent charges almost
certainly would soon.99
Under this approach, plaintiffs may have standing even when they
plead that the precise amount of harm may not be clear for “some
time.”100 For example, in the Ninth Circuit case In re Zappos.com, a
hacker stole credit card information of over 24 million individuals from
Zappos.com; the plaintiffs then alleged that they “[might] not see the
full extent of identity theft or identity fraud for years.”101 Yet, the court

92. Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693.
93. Id.
94. Galaria, 663 F. App’x. at 388.
95. Id. at 386.
96. Id. at 388.
97. Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693 (quoting In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d.
1197, 1214 (N.D. Cal. 2014)).
98. Id. at 689–90.
99. Id. at 693–94 (“The plaintiffs are also careful to say that only 9,200 cards have
experienced fraudulent charges so far; the complaint asserts that fraudulent charges and identity
theft can occur long after a data breach.” (emphasis in original)).
100. In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1028–29 (9th Cir. 2018).
101. Id.
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found that the plaintiffs had standing regardless of potential delay in
harm because the thieves already had “all the information . . . needed
to open accounts or spend money in the plaintiffs’ names.”102
Additionally, the type of data exposed—that is, whether it is
particularly sensitive to misuse—may matter.103 The Zappos court, for
example, found it important that credit card numbers are particularly
vulnerable to identity theft.104 And in In re U.S. Office of Personnel
Mgmt.,105 the D.C. Circuit found that the plaintiffs had standing
following a hack of the United States Office of Personnel Management
in part because social security numbers and fingerprint records were
especially sensitive to misuse.106
C. Third Approach: An Increased Risk of Harm After a Data Breach
is Not an Injury in Fact
The third approach used by courts is that a data breach by itself
cannot generally indicate a cognizable injury regardless of whether
there is an increased risk of future misuse. Courts that refuse to find
standing for claims of increased risk of future harm tend to do so
because plaintiffs rely on too many assumptions, making an actual
injury “hypothetical.”107 To these courts, victims’ credit card and bank
statements may be “exactly the same today as they would have been
had [a] database never been hacked.”108 That is, a data breach itself
constitutes mere means to real harm.109
In Beck v. McDonald, the Fourth Circuit found that the plaintiffs
did not have standing after the data breach of a hospital because the
plaintiffs could not show their information was or would be misused.110

102. Id. at 1023, 1026.
103. In re U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 928 F.3d 42, 58, 60 (D.C. Cir.
2019); Zappos, 888 F.3d at 1027–28.
104. Zappos, 888 F.3d at 1027–28 (discussing the particular sensitivity of credit card
information).
105. Plaintiffs brought claims under the Federal Information Security Management Act of
2002, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3541, et seq. (2012) (repealed 2014), and the Federal Information Security
Modernization Act of 2014 (“FISMA 14”), 44 U.S.C. §§ 3551 et seq. (2018). Both acts provided
required software security steps for federal agencies. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 928 F.3d at 51.
106. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 928 F.3d at 49, 58, 60. The court also found standing in part because
some plaintiffs had already suffered harm.
107. Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011).
108. Id. at 45.
109. See, e.g., Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 698 F. App’x. 89, 91 (2d Cir. 2017) (finding a
data breach of a brick-and-mortar retailer does not itself constitute an injury in fact for individuals
whose information was exposed).
110. Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 275–76 (4th Cir. 2017).
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The plaintiffs relied on the Privacy Act of 1974, which applies to federal
agencies.111 A Veterans Affairs Medical Center had lost personal
information of 7,400 patients after a laptop went missing, likely from
theft.112 The Fourth Circuit found that although a violation of the
Privacy Act was potentially a concrete injury, the plaintiffs did not
demonstrate that future harm was imminent.113 Plaintiffs neither met
the “certainly impending” threshold for harm nor the lesser standard
of “substantial risk” of future harm.114 It was not enough that
objectively thirty-three percent of the plaintiffs would suffer identity
theft—a fact that the court accepted as true for the analysis of
standing—because the other sixty-six percent “w[ould] suffer no
harm.”115 To find standing, the court would have had to make
unfounded assumptions in an “attenuated chain.”116
Similarly, in In re SuperValu, the Eighth Circuit refused to hold that
the plaintiffs had standing after hackers stole credit card information
from computer systems of over 1,000 SuperValu grocery stores.117
Plaintiffs sued the grocery store chain under state statutory and
common law claims.118 The court found that although the plaintiffs
demonstrated the possibility of future harm, mere possibility was not
enough.119 Credit card information did not alone indicate a high
likelihood of fraudulent use because no accompanying “personally
identifying information,” such as birth dates or social security numbers,
was stolen.120 Accordingly, there was little risk that a bad actor could
“open unauthorized accounts in the plaintiffs’ names.”121 The court
thought that there was still a risk of “unauthorized charges” using
existing credit card accounts, but that risk was not enough to indicate a
“substantial risk” of harm sufficient for standing.122
In Wilding v. DNC Services Corp., the Eleventh Circuit found that
being the victim of a data breach does not alone mean plaintiffs have

111. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2018); 5 U.S.C. § 552(f) (2018).
112. Beck, 848 F.3d at 267.
113. See id. at 271 n.4 (discussing that some other circuits, following Spokeo, have found
violation of a privacy statute to be a de facto concrete injury).
114. Id. at 268, 275–76.
115. Id. at 268.
116. Id. at 275.
117. In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 765 (8th Cir. 2017).
118. Id. at 767.
119. Id. at 771–72.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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standing under common law.123 The court stated that “[t]here is
admittedly some support for the notion that the mere violation of a
state-law right satisfies Article III even in the absence of an identifiable
injury.”124 But nonetheless, “[w]e require plaintiffs asserting violations
of state-created rights to demonstrate a concrete injury; the defendant’s
violation of those rights is not enough.”125 In Wilding, registered
Democrats and donors to the Democratic National Committee
(“DNC”) sued the DNC after hackers breached its servers during the
2016 Presidential election.126 The Wilding plaintiffs formed multiple
classes, one of which alleged a simple breach of fiduciary duty.127 That
class did not have standing.128
D. Analyzing the Split
A few trends emerge from the circuit split regarding standing in
data breach cases.129 First, plaintiffs tend to bring suits under state law,
grounded in federal diversity jurisdiction, rather than under federal
statutes.130 This is likely due to a lack of federal statutory causes of
action available, leading to difficulty finding federal question
jurisdiction.131 For example, FCRA only applies to consumer reporting
agencies,132 and the Privacy Act only applies to federal agencies.133
Second, however, cases that do hinge on federal statutes fare
significantly better than those that hinge on state law. Plaintiffs had
standing in all but one case where a federal statute was in question.
Beck is the one case based on a federal statute where the court did not
find that plaintiffs had standing, but Beck is perhaps unique. In Beck,
the Fourth Circuit refused to find that plaintiffs had standing for claims
brought under the Privacy Act after a laptop containing sensitive

123. Wilding v. DNC Servs. Corp., 941 F. 3d 1116, 1130 (11th Cir. 2019).
124. Id. at 1131.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1122–23.
127. Id. at 1130.
128. Id. A different class of plaintiffs that alleged actual financial loss did have standing
because “[s]uch economic harm is a well-established injury for purposes of Article III standing.”
Id. at 1125. In this way, the court seemingly followed the second approach of the circuit split.
Supra Part II.B.
129. The analysis of Part II.D is based on each cited case reviewed in Parts II.A–C.
130. This finding based on each cited case reviewed in Parts II.A–C, plus prior or ancillary
precedent not discussed.
131. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2018).
132. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (2018).
133. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2018) (laying out requirements for agencies); 5 U.S.C. § 552(f) (2018)
(defining “agency”).
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personal information went missing.134 But the Fourth Circuit later
found that plaintiffs had standing in Hutton, a case with state law claims
and strong evidence of impending future harm. However, the cases can
be reconciled. The court explained, “[i]n Beck, the plaintiffs alleged
only a threat of future injury in the data breach context where a laptop
and boxes . . . had been stolen, but the information contained therein
had not been misused.”135 Moreover, the court “concluded that the
threat was speculative because ‘even after extensive discovery’ there
was ‘no evidence that the information contained on [a] stolen laptop
[had] been accessed or misused or that [the plaintiffs had] suffered
identity theft.’”136 Thus, it seems the Beck plaintiffs did not have
standing from a lack of specificity in their pleadings and scant evidence
after discovery.137 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit may find that plaintiffs
have standing if they allege more than just theft itself.138
Also notable is that the Third Circuit has both granted and denied
standing for data breach cases alleging a risk of future injury. These
cases can also be reconciled. In Ceridian, the court refused to find that
standing existed for state common law claims stemming from a
cyberattack because even with some possibility of future harm, the risk
was too speculative.139 But the court found that plaintiffs had standing
in Horizon, a case brought after suspected laptop theft, which hinged
on FCRA.140 These cases taken together indicate that the Third Circuit
affords great weight to decisions of Congress to create federal causes
of action via legislation.
III. THE PROPER FRAMEWORK FOR STANDING
All three current approaches to standing are improper because a
data breach causes an inherently cognizable legal injury the moment
that information is exposed or acquired. In Horizon, the Third Circuit
came close to this approach but only when plaintiffs alleged harm
under the FCRA federal statute.141 A more proper approach would
extend that framework to common law claims: that “the unauthorized

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
2017).
141.

Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 267 (4th Cir. 2017).
Hutton v. Nat’l Bd. of Exam’rs in Optometry, Inc., 892 F.3d 613, 621–22 (4th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 622.
Id.
Beck, 848 F.3d at 275.
Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 41, 46 (3d Cir. 2011).
In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 639 n.20 (3d Cir.
See supra notes 72–86 and accompanying text.
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dissemination of personal information . . . causes an injury in and of
itself—whether or not the disclosure of that information increased the
risk of identity theft or some other future harm.”142 This approach is in
line with long-recognized tort law and contract law principles.
Additionally, because a data breach itself causes a cognizable injury,
Clapper’s framework requiring plaintiffs to show that future harm is
imminent should not govern data breach cases. Clapper was about
injuries based entirely on a speculative future event. However, a data
breach case is about a past event: the unauthorized disclosure of
information. Finding standing through this approach also upholds
standing’s main purpose of separation of powers.
A. Unauthorized Disclosure of Information is an Injury in and of Itself
After hackers access sensitive personal information, the initial
reaction of victims may, unsurprisingly, be alarm.143 Indeed, in any data
breach, an unauthorized third-party accesses a victim’s private
information.144 In some cases, merely a social security number with its
corresponding name can be enough for a bad actor to commit identity
theft.145 However, if data breaches are harmful because of the fraud to
which they lead, one could argue that there is no harm in a data breach
itself. It may be unsettling when information that was expected to be
kept confidential by its steward is exposed. Still, to build a case for why
data breach plaintiffs have standing, that exposure must be
contextualized under a legal theory of harm. This Section lays such a
framework and explains why a data breach is an inherently cognizable
injury under common law tort and contract regimes.
1. Data Breaches as Tortious Invasions
Experts maintain that “[i]t’s totally reasonable to assume that your
social security number has been compromised at least once, if not many
times,”146 and that “repercussions of a breach can be very delayed,

142. St. Pierre v. Retrieval-Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc., 898 F.3d 351, 357 (3d Cir. 2018)
(quoting Horizon, 846 F.3d at 639).
143. See In re U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 928 F.3d 42, 49 (D.C. Cir.
2019) (“[T]he data breaches affected more than twenty-one million people. Unsurprisingly, given
the scale of the attacks and the sensitive nature of the information stolen, news of the breaches
generated not only widespread alarm, but also several lawsuits.”).
144. Symantec, What Is a Data Breach?, NORTON, https://us.norton.com/internetsecurityprivacy-data-breaches-what-you-need-to-know.html (last visited Dec. 9, 2019).
145. Paul Wagenseil, What to Do After a Data Breach, TOM’S GUIDE (Apr. 15, 2019),
https://www.tomsguide.com/us/data-breach-to-dos,news-18007.html.
146. Suzanne Rowan Kelleher, Everyone’s Social Number Has Been Compromised. Here’s
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sometimes not fully manifesting for years.”147 It would follow, then, that
many individuals have already had their social security number
compromised yet are unaware, unflinching, and unharmed. Under
these circumstances, perhaps it might be correct to view a data breach
as not itself an injury in fact. The common law, after all, does not
recognize unconsented information disclosure as injurious unless the
disclosure is “harmful to one’s reputation or otherwise offensive.”148
However, the mere exposure of information from a data breach is
intuitively offensive because sensitive private facts are disseminated,
which may cause anxiety over the threat of looming injuries or
embarrassment.149 This “value of mental suffering” has long been
recognized in American law, a seminal conception of which was
asserted in 1890150 in The Right to Privacy.151 In that essay, Justice Louis
Brandeis and Samuel Warren argued that the invasion of privacy, like
defamation, should be actionable.152 Indeed, modern privacy torts,153
including “unreasonable publicity” and “breach of confidence,” protect
against such exposure.154 Both of those torts are actionable so long as
pleadings allege that a third party gained unauthorized access to the

How to Protect Yourself., FORBES (Aug. 1, 2019, 1:42 P.M.), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
suzannerowankelleher/2019/08/01/everyones-social-security-number-has-been-compromisedheres-how-to-protect-yourself/#4848379a29ac.
147. Lily Hay Newman, supra note 14, at ¶ 4.
148. In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 639 (3d Cir. 2017).
149. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common
Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 964 (1989) (“An intrusion on privacy is intrinsically harmful
because it is defined as that which injures social personality.” (emphasis in original)).
150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (2016) (“The right of privacy has been
defined as the right to be let alone. Prior to 1890 no English or American court had ever expressly
recognized the existence of the right, although there were decisions that in retrospect appear to
have protected it in one manner or another.”).
151. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 213
(1890).
152. Id. at 218–19.
153. RESTATEMENT, supra note 150, § 652A (enumerating the four ways in which privacy is
invaded); David A. Elder, Privacy Torts § 1:1 (2016).
154. See Kamal v. J. Crew Grp., Inc., 918 F.3d 102, 114 (3d Cir. 2019) (describing unreasonable
publicity and breach of confidence as “[h]arms actionable under traditional privacy torts”); In re
Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 638–39 (3d Cir. 2017) (“And
with privacy torts, improper dissemination of information can itself constitute a cognizable
injury.”); Post, supra note 149, at 964 (“[T]he privacy tort enables a plaintiff to make out his case
without alleging or proving any actual or contingent injury, such as emotional suffering or
embarrassment. The privacy tort shares this profile with other torts which redress ‘dignitary
harms.’”); Alan B. Vickery, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1426,
1455 (1982) (“[T]he tort can be defined in general terms as the unconsented, unprivileged
disclosure to a third party of nonpublic information that the defendant has learned within a
confidential relationship.”).
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plaintiffs’ information.155 A data breach is no different. A hacker is an
intruding third party who gains unauthorized access to plaintiffs’
information through a steward entrusted with it.156
The Supreme Court confirmed in Doe v. Chao that for “privacy and
defamation torts,” damages are “presumed . . . without reference to
specific harm.”157 Logically, if damages are presumed, then so should be
standing.158 The Third Circuit even noted in Horizon that because
damages to one’s privacy are “uncertain and possibly unmeasurable,”
privacy tort victims may be awarded money damages that are
“calculated without proving actual damages.”159 To that end, courts
should, at least for standing purposes, presume injury regardless of how
plaintiffs might label their injuries, whether as certain torts or simply
negligence.160
The suggested limiting principle to this approach is that data breach
plaintiffs must still factually show either that they lost control over their
information or that a bad actor gained unauthorized access to it. This
threshold will almost always be met when a case arises from a hack,
which is by definition unauthorized access to data.161 But plaintiffs in
laptop theft cases may face greater burdens. For example, in a case of
laptop theft where personal information is stored on the laptop, privacy
is invaded as soon as the laptop is in the hands of an unintended
recipient.162 Then, individuals whose information is accessible within

155. Kamal, 918 F.3d at 114; Horizon, 846 F.3d at 638–39; Vickery, supra note 154, at 1455.
156. See Alicia Solow-Niederman, Beyond the Privacy Torts: Reinvigorating a Common Law
Approach for Data Breaches, 127 YALE L.J.F. 614, 627–28 (2018) (arguing that an organization
entrusted with data is a “data confidant” with fiduciary duties).
157. Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 621 (2004); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540,
1549 (2016) (“[T]he law has long permitted recovery by certain tort victims even if their harms
may be difficult to prove or measure.”).
158. See Lauren E. Willis, Spokeo Misspeaks, 50 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 233, 249 (2017) (arguing
that “the Supreme Court has never blinked at” the presumption of damages in libel and
defamation suits, and so “the question of standing” need not be raised).
159. Horizon, 846 F.3d at 638–39.
160. E.g., In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 767 (8th Cir. 2017) (mentioning that the
plaintiffs raised negligence claims); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 696–97
(7th Cir. 2015) (addressing claims that the defendant was negligent in protecting the plaintiffs’
information).
161. Tripwire Guest Authors, The Evolution of Hacking, TRIPWIRE.COM (Aug. 17, 2016),
https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cyber-security/the-evolution
-of-hacking/.
162. See In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[In Krottner] we held
that employees of Starbucks had standing to sue the company based on the risk of identity theft
they faced after a company laptop containing their personal information was stolen.”); Krottner
v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Here, Plaintiffs-Appellants have alleged
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have suffered a cognizable injury.163 But if a thief steals a laptop that
does not actually store information—e.g., if the information is stored
on a cloud server—164 the laptop theft alone might not implicate a
cognizable injury because no personal information was exposed,
acquired, or otherwise accessed.165 Therefore, with a hack, it will
generally be clear whether a bad actor accessed private information.166
But standing in laptop theft cases may not be immediately clear,
depending the facts at hand.167 This limiting factor does not cut against
a court’s ability to label a data breach as a common law injury; instead,
it merely recognizes that there might be cases where a data breach is
factually difficult to establish as having occurred at all.
Once it is established the plaintiffs’ information was accessed
without authorization, any alleged “increased risk of future harm”
stemming from that data breach is harm anchored to and extending
from it.168 For example, plaintiffs may allege that because of a data
breach, they face an increased risk of identity theft.169 Thus, potential
future harm simply adds to the harm from the data exposure itself.
Courts should therefore evaluate that likelihood of future harm as an
inquiry into causation and damages during later phases of litigation:
Did the data breach proximately cause the alleged future harm, and if
so, then how much is that predicted harm worth?170 The Ninth Circuit
took this approach in Zappos, stating “[t]hat hackers might have stolen
a credible threat of real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of a laptop containing their
unencrypted personal data.”).
163. Horizon, 846 F.3d at 642 (Schwartz, J., concurring).
164. See Wendy Zamora, Should You Store Your Data in the Cloud?, MALWAREBYTES LABS
(July 26, 2018), https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2016/04/should-you-store-your-data-in-thecloud/ (explaining that data stored in the “cloud” is not physically on a single computer).
165. The plaintiffs in Beck, where the Fourth Circuit found that the plaintiffs did not have
standing, may still not have standing even under the approach proposed in this Note. Hutton v.
Nat’l Bd. of Exam’rs in Optometry, Inc., 892 F.3d 613, 622 (4th Cir. 2018) (“[W]e concluded [in
Beck] that the threat was speculative because ‘even after extensive discovery’ there was ‘no
evidence that the information contained on [a] stolen laptop [had] been accessed or misused or
that [the plaintiffs had] suffered identity theft.’”).
166. E.g., Zappos, 888 F.3d at 1023 (noting that the defendant told customers that their
personal information had been stolen); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x. 384,
386 (6th Cir. 2016) (noting that the defendant acknowledged the data breach occurred and
advised customers to monitor their bank statements to prevent misuse of stolen data).
167. Hutton, 892 F.3d at 622.
168. See Horizon, 846 F.3d at 642 (“While [loss of privacy] may or may not be sufficient to
state a claim for relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the intangible harm from the loss of privacy
appears to have sufficient historical roots to satisfy the requirement that Plaintiffs have alleged a
sufficiently concrete harm for standing purposes.”).
169. See supra notes 94–99 and accompanying text (discussing circuit cases in which plaintiffs
alleged an increased risk of identity theft or other harm as caused by data breaches).
170. Id.; Zappos, 888 F.3d at 1029.
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Plaintiffs’ [personally identifying information] in unrelated breaches,
and that Plaintiffs might suffer identity theft or fraud caused by the
data stolen in those other breaches (rather than the data stolen from
Zappos), is less about standing and more about the merits of causation
and damages.”171
Perhaps more importantly, data breach victims may buy
prophylactic services to protect themselves from the risk of identity
theft.172 Victims, for example, may buy credit monitoring services in
direct response to their credit card numbers being compromised.173
Such time and money spent to “set things straight” indicates an injury
in fact.174 Any court that may have trouble concluding that
unauthorized data disclosure is a cognizable injury should surely, once
the plaintiffs allege actual purchase of mitigation expenses, find
standing. These mitigation expenses, if reasonable, are not
manufactured or self-imposed.175 They reflect non-speculative, “actual
injuries” because the harm already occurred, and the risk of future
fraud is “sufficiently immediate to justify mitigation efforts.”176 These
expenses can include costs to investigate and monitor potential fraud,
to cancel and re-issue credit cards,177 or simply “the time value of
money” and legwork used to stop the bleeding caused by a data
breach.178
Additionally, the hacker and the compromised steward of
information may both be at fault for plaintiffs’ injuries.179 Whether the
defendant actually violated the law or whether an ill-intentioned
hacker is solely at fault is not a question of Article III standing.180 And,
171. Zappos, 888 F.3d at 1029.
172. In re 21st Century Oncology Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 380 F. Supp. 3d 1243,
1256–57 (M.D. Fla. 2019).
173. See Dieffenbach v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 887 F.3d 826, 828 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he value
of one’s own time needed to set things straight is a loss from an opportunity-cost perspective.
These injuries can justify money damages, just as they support standing.”).
174. Id.
175. See Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963, 967 (7th Cir. 2016)
(confirming that “the time and money spent resolving fraudulent charges are cognizable injuries
for Article III standing” and that expenses to replace cards and purchasing credit monitoring
services are reasonable mitigation costs after a data breach).
176. Id.
177. In re Equifax, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 371 F. Supp. 3d. 1150, 1160 (N.D.
Ga. 2019).
178. Dieffenbach, 887 F.3d at 828.
179. See Remijas v. Nieman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 696 (7th Cir. 2015) (“The fact
that Target or some other store might have caused the plaintiffs’ private information to be
exposed does nothing to negate the plaintiffs’ standing to sue.” (emphasis in original)).
180. See Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“Here, by contrast, an
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to the extent these fault determinations matter for standing, they go to
traceability, not whether a plaintiff suffered an injury in fact. The Sixth
Circuit in Galaria noted that “[a]lthough hackers are the direct cause
of Plaintiffs’ injuries, the hackers were able to access Plaintiffs’ data
only because [the defendant] allegedly failed to secure the sensitive
personal information entrusted to its custody,” and “[t]h[o]se
allegations meet the threshold for Article III traceability.”181 If a court
decides that the risk of identity theft or fraud is not the compromised
organization’s fault, that determination will be made after standing has
been established.182 Therefore, if a data breach lawsuit must be
dismissed, it should be dismissed on the merits under Rule 12(b)(6),183
on summary judgment184 or after a trial, not for the plaintiffs’ lack of
standing.185
Relatedly, some circuit courts suggest that the type of data
compromised should affect standing analysis.186 These courts are
correct that the type of data stolen affects the likelihood that a bad
actor will misuse it.187 Personal information varies and can include
biometric data,188 bank account numbers,189 or home address
unauthorized party has already accessed personally identifying data on CareFirst’s servers, and it
is much less speculative—at the very least, it is plausible—to infer that this party has both the
intent and the ability to use that data for ill.”); Remijas, 794 F.3d at 696.
181. Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x. 384, 390 (6th Cir. 2016) (attributing
questions of causation to “traceability” in the opinion, not to questions of if plaintiffs suffered an
injury in fact).
182. In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 642 (3d Cir. 2017)
(Schwartz, J., concurring); Remijas, 794 F.3d at 696.
183. Horizon, 846 F.3d at 642.
184. FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
185. E.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (“Although standing in no way depends
on the merits of the plaintiffs’ contention that particular conduct is illegal, it often turns on the
nature and source of the claim alleged.”) (emphasis added); Wilding v. DNC Servs. Corp., 941
F.3d 1116, 1128 (11th Cir. 2019) (“Whether a plaintiff has Article III standing is a question distinct
from whether she has a statutory cause of action.”).
186. See, e.g., In re U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 928 F.3d 42, 59 (D.C.
Cir. 2019) (discussing “the nature of the information stolen” and “governmental character of the
databases at issue”); In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 769 (8th Cir. 2017) (“We need not
reconcile this out-of-circuit precedent [of data breach cases] because the cases ultimately turned
on the substance of the allegations before each court.”).
187. Zak Doffman, New Data Breach Has Exposed Millions of Fingerprint and Facial
Recognition Records: Report ¶ 2, FORBES (Aug. 14, 2019, 4:31 A.M.), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/zakdoffman/2019/08/14/new-data-breach-has-exposed-millions-of-fingerprint-and-facialrecognition-records-report/#6086b48e46c6 (“The issue with biometric data being stored in this
way is that, unlike usernames and passwords, it cannot be changed. Once it’s compromised, it’s
compromised. And for that reason this breach report will sound all kinds of alarms.”).
188. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 928 F.3d at 68 (addressing a data breach where fingerprints were
exposed).
189. E.g., In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir. 2018).
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information.190 Stolen information may also be stale, or out of date, and
thus less valuable to hackers.191 But the type of data stolen should not
affect whether plaintiffs have standing. The type of data compromised
is a question of how much plaintiffs were harmed or whether the
plaintiffs’ mitigation costs were reasonable, not whether the plaintiffs
have standing.192
2. Data Breaches as Breaches of Contract
Alternative to theories of harm grounded in tort law are those
grounded in contract law, especially in jurisdictions that follow the
economic-loss doctrine.193 Under the economic-loss doctrine, courts
may refuse to recognize economic losses under tort law when the
parties have already chosen to order those same rights by express
contract.194 Indeed, many data breach plaintiffs bring causes of action
under breach of contract,195 of which there are three key formulations:
(1) a plaintiff’s express contract with the defendant to protect data,196
(2) a plaintiff’s implied contract with the defendant to protect data,197
or (3) a plaintiff as a third-party beneficiary of an express contract
between the defendant and another party, like a database vendor.198 In
each case, plaintiffs have standing as soon as they reasonably allege
breach of a valid contract.

190. Lily Hay Newman, supra note 14, at ¶ 1.
191. Data Breach, MALWAREBYTES, https://www.malwarebytes.com/data-breach/ (last
visited Dec. 9, 2019) (discussing how stolen data that is at least “two to three years old” is still
valuable to hackers).
192. See Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x. 384, 386 (2016) (“Plaintiffs’
allegations of a substantial risk of harm, coupled with reasonably incurred mitigation costs, are
sufficient to establish a cognizable Article III injury at the pleading stage of the litigation.”).
193. David Balser et al., supra note 7, at ¶ 18 (“It remains to be seen whether Schnuck Markets
will gain traction outside the Seventh Circuit, but no court has rejected the Seventh Circuit’s
reasoning and one district court has relied on Schnuck Markets to dismiss financial institutions’
claims.”).
194. Cmty. Bank of Trenton v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 887 F.3d 803, 812 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting
Indianapolis-Marion Cty. Pub. Library v. Charlier Clark & Linard, P.C., 929 N.E.2d 722, 729 (Ind.
2010)) (“The reason for this rule is that ‘liability for purely economic loss . . . is more
appropriately determined by commercial rather than tort law,’ i.e., by the system of rights and
remedies created by the parties themselves.”).
195. E.g., Hutton v. Nat’l Bd. of Exam’rs in Optometry, Inc., 892 F.3d 613, 616 (4th Cir. 2018);
In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 771 n.6 (8th Cir. 2017); Remijas v. Nieman Marcus Grp., LLC,
794 F.3d 688, 690 (7th Cir. 2015).
196. E.g., Kuhns v. Scottrade, Inc., 868 F.3d 711, 717 (8th Cir. 2017).
197. SuperValu, 870 F.3d at 767 (addressing a breach of implied contract claim).
198. Rottlund Homes of N.J., Inc. v. Saul, Ewing, Remick & Saul, L.L.P., 243 F. Supp. 2d 145,
153 (D. Del. 2003).
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First, plaintiffs may allege that the targeted and compromised
organization breached an express contract to “protect [plaintiffs’]
sensitive information.”199 Plaintiffs who bring these claims essentially
have automatic standing because a plaintiff who is a party to an express
contract “has a judicially cognizable interest for standing purposes,
regardless of the merits of the breach alleged.”200 A stock brokerage,
for example, may owe to its customers an express contractual
obligation to “maintain sufficient security measures and procedures to
prevent unauthorized access” to data.201 Such a financial institution
may also explicitly promise its customers that it will “use security
measures,” such as encryption, to “comply with federal law.”202
Plaintiffs still face a burden to allege that a defendant breached an
express contractual provision; bare assertions that the defendant failed
to protect data may prove insufficient.203 However, assuming pleadings
show that defendants breached an express contract, plaintiffs should
simply have standing.
Second, plaintiffs have standing when they allege that a defendant
organization breached an implied contract to take reasonable steps to
protect data.204 Certainly, a defendant may be at fault for a legal injury
caused by a data breach if the defendant was contractually obligated to
try to prevent the data breach.205 Plaintiffs, however, may face a
challenge convincing a court that an implied contract actually exists
because an implied contract is “not formally or explicitly stated in
words.”206 That is, the existence of an implied contract must be inferred
from the parties’ conduct given the facts and circumstances of a case,
rather than referencing an explicit written agreement.207

199. Case v. Miami Beach Health Grp., Ltd., 166 F. Supp. 3d 1315, 1318–19 (S.D. Fla. 2016).
200. SuperValu, 870 F.3d at 771 n.6.
201. Scottrade, 868 F.3d at 717.
202. Id.
203. See id. (holding that plaintiffs merely alleged “bare assertions that Scottrade’s efforts
failed to protect customer [personally identifiable information]” and that “even if the security
representations can be construed as promises of contract performance, the lengthy Consolidated
Complaint fails to allege a specific breach of the express contract”).
204. SuperValu, 870 F.3d at 771 n.6 (quoting Carlsen v. GameStop, Inc., 833 F.3d 903, 909 (8th
Cir. 2016)) (internal quotations omitted).
205. Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 72 (1st Cir. 2012) (“From an analytical standpoint,
we think . . . that when a plaintiff generally alleges the existence of a contract, express or implied,
and a concomitant breach of that contract, her pleading adequately shows an injury to her
rights.”).
206. Dawes Min. Co. v. Callahan, 267 S.E.2d. 830, 831–32 (Ga. App. 1980), aff’d 272 S.E.2d
267 (Ga. 1980)).
207. Id.; Enslin v. The Coca-Cola Co., 136 F. Supp. 3d 654, 675 (E.D. Pa. 2015).
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These evidentiary differences make standing for the breach of an
implied contract more difficult to demonstrate than for breach of an
express contract. In SuperValu, for example, the Eighth Circuit found
that the plaintiffs did not have standing because they failed to show
that they were a party to an implied contract with a grocery store to
“take reasonable steps to protect” data.208 Although the SuperValu
court did not rule out that the breach of an implied contract could ever
be adequate for standing,209 the court could have read the pleadings
more leniently. Given the facts and circumstances, a better outcome
would have been that the plaintiffs had standing. A reasonable grocery
store customer “[o]rdinarily . . . does not expect—and certainly does
not intend—the merchant to allow unauthorized third-parties to access
[transmitted] data,” nor does a customer ever reasonably intend that
their credit card information be provided to anyone but the
merchant.210 Undoubtedly, it would have been proper to conclude that
the grocery stores had an implied contractual duty to “take reasonable
measures to protect [customer] information.”211
Moreover, the existence of an implied contract will be even less
dubious if a defendant disseminates a privacy policy, regardless of
whether the defendant is a brick and mortar business212 or a website.213
For example, the privacy policy on Yahoo’s website has been held to
constitute a contract to “employ reasonable safeguards” to protect
users’ personal information, despite Yahoo not specifically promising
to invest time or money in cybersecurity.214 Alternatively, a hotel chain’s
privacy policy that states the hotel is committed to safeguarding
customer information may constitute an enforceable promise sufficient
for standing.215 Such a contractual duty may extend to guests for the
period of time in which they stay on hotel premises.216 Similarly, health
care providers will likely be bound by implied contracts to protect

208. SuperValu, 870 F.3d at 771 n.6 (internal quotations omitted).
209. See id. (“Even if such analysis applies to an implied contract—a question we need not
decide here—the complaint does not sufficiently allege that plaintiffs were party to such a
contract.”).
210. Anderson v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 659 F.3d 151, 159 (1st Cir. 2011).
211. Id.
212. Walters v. Kimpton Hotel & Rest. Grp., LLC, 2017 WL 1398660, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. Apr.
13, 2017).
213. In re Yahoo! Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 2017 WL 3727318, at *48 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 30, 2017).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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patients’ data from thieves.217 Health care providers may represent
themselves as promising to protect personal information in their
agreements with patients, website announcements, or press releases.218
Then, patients agree to give up their sensitive personal information in
exchange for the provider’s “implicit and inescapable representation[]”
that the health care provider will at least do “something” to protect
patient information.219 Plaintiffs may still not have standing if they
allege the breach of an implied contract but without actual resulting
injuries or damages.220 And some courts do not consider the release of
sensitive personal information without evidence of misuse to be an
adequate injury.221 But, as argued earlier in this Note, a data breach
causes a cognizable legal injury both in terms of mental suffering222 and
actual financial loss incurred to purchase preventative services.223
Finally, under the third-party beneficiary doctrine, plaintiffs may
have standing to sue for breach of contract even when they are not a
party to the contract at issue. For example, a defendant in a data breach
case may have entered into a contract with another company in which
that company agreed to help the defendant protect its electronic
business records. Those records may have included the plaintiffs’ data
with which the defendant was entrusted. In such a case, the defendant
and the other company are co-stewards of the plaintiffs’ information,
and the plaintiffs are third-party beneficiaries of that contract.224 Under
the third-party beneficiary doctrine, plaintiffs in such a case need only
show that there was a contract “made for the[ir] benefit . . . within the
intent and contemplation of the contracting parties.”225 Essentially,
“benefits flow to both the promisee and the third party, and either may
sue to enforce the contract.”226 In a data breach case, a plaintiff might

217. Lozada v. Advocate Health & Diagnostic Corp., 2018 WL 7080045, at *6 (Ill. App. Ct.
Dec. 24, 2018).
218. Id. at *2.
219. Id.
220. E.g., Cherny v. Emigrant Bank, 604 F. Supp. 2d 605, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
221. Id.
222. See supra notes 142–156 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 172–178 and accompanying text.
224. E.g., Mendez v. Hampton Court Nursing Ctr., LLC, 203 So. 3d 146, 148 (Fla. 2016);
Flaherty & Collins, Inc. v. BBR-Vision I, L.P., 990 N.E.2d 958, 971 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
225. Rottlund Homes of N.J., Inc. v. Saul, Ewing, Remick & Saul, L.L.P., 243 F. Supp. 2d 145,
153 (D. Del. 2003).
226. In re Spong, 661 F.2d 6, 10 (2d Cir. 1981); see also Beckett v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 995
F.2d 280, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“[I]t is a fundamental principle of contract law that parties to a
contract may create enforceable contract rights in a third party beneficiary.”); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (1981) (illustrating the third-party beneficiary doctrine).
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allege breach of an express provision requiring a database vendor to
protect the compromised defendant’s information.227 Prior to the
Capital One data breach discussed above,228 where a hacker accessed
over 100 million credit card numbers, Capital One had contracted with
Amazon Web Services (“AWS”) to store Capital One’s data and
software applications on cloud servers operated by AWS.229 Potential
liability following the Capital One data breach has not yet settled,230
but the individual victims of the data breach could arguably sue to
enforce the contract as third-party beneficiaries.231 Each individual
Capital One customer was a third-party beneficiary, with standing to
sue for breach of contract, assuming the intent of the contract between
Capital One and AWS was to protect customers’ credit card data or it
included a provision to the same effect.232 It is worth noting that such
contracts might validly prohibit third-party suits.233 But whether a
contract bans third-party beneficiary suits is a question of contract
interpretation, not of whether a contract exists or if there is threshold
standing.234
3. Federal Statutory Reinforcement
Common law considerations aside, plaintiffs in data breach cases
may sue under federal statutory authority. And when a plaintiff sues
under a federal statute, existence of a cognizable injury should be even

227. E.g., Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 73 (1st Cir. 2012).
228. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing the Capital One data breach)
229. Cloud Security at AWS is the Highest Priority, AMAZON WEB SERVS. (2015),
https://aws.amazon.com/campaigns/cloud-transformation/capital-one/.
230. See Kevin LaCroix, Guest Post: Is Amazon Liable for the Capital One Hack?, D&O
DIARY (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.dandodiary.com/2019/08/articles/cyber-liability/guest-postis-amazon-liable-for-the-capital-one-hack/ (suggesting that AWS could be liable for the Capital
One data breach and stating that “just about every corporate data breach that involves a third
party vendor results in some level of finger-pointing between the two”).
231. See id. at “The AWS/Capital One Contract” (restating provisions of the contract
between Capital One and AWS and concluding that “[t]he above provisions are not ambiguous,
and clearly define data security responsibilities to belong to the AWS customer”).
232. Id.
233. In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 2011 WL 1232352,
at *1, *18 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2011); Pa. State Emps. Credit Union v. Fifth Third Bank, 398 F.
Supp. 2d 317, 324 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (“While [The Restatement, adopted here by the state]
recognizes that a nonsignatory to a contract can be an intended beneficiary of the contract if
certain conditions are met, it recognizes the right of the contracting parties to exclude third parties
from invoking the benefits of their agreement.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 302 (1981).
234. See Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 72–73 (1st Cir. 2012); Heartland Payment Sys.,
2011 WL 1232352, at *16–18 (discussing third-party suits in the context of Rule 12(b)(6)).
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less dubious than if it were under common law.235 Sometimes, a statute
provides plaintiffs a cause of action by simply elevating the legal status
of a common law harm.236 Or, Congress may enact a statute to “give
rise to a case or controversy where none existed before.”237 In either
case, federal statutes introduce to standing analysis rights that Congress
deliberately sought to protect.238 For example, the disclosure of
personal information became a de facto injury when Congress enacted
FCRA.239 Labeling an event like a data breach as a de facto injury may
appear to ignore the requirement that an injury be “actual or
imminent,” essentially collapsing analysis to only address the
“particularized” and “concrete” requirements. But there is no need to
address imminence of future harm alleged in such a case because the
loss of privacy caused by a data breach is an actual and present injury.240
To be sure, Congress could enact legislation that specifically creates
a private right of action for data breach victims, as suggested by many
commentators.241 This Note does not address the intricacies or political
practicality of such a federal statute, other than agreeing that such an
enactment is a good idea. A federal statute aimed at broadly providing
data breach victims with a cause of action would likely eliminate many
challenges plaintiffs face in satisfying standing requirements.242 Such a
statute would also advance the public policies later outlined in Part IV
of this Note.243
235. See In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 639–40 (3d
Cir. 2017) (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016)) (“[S]ince the ‘intangible
harm’ that FCRA seeks to remedy ‘has a close relationship to a harm [i.e. invasion of privacy]
that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American
courts,’ we have no trouble concluding that Congress properly defined an injury that ‘give[s] rise
to a case or controversy where none existed before.’”).
236. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992).
237. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
238. E.g., id.; Horizon, 846 F.3d at 634.
239. Horizon, 846 F.3d at 639 (“[W]ith the passage of FCRA, Congress established that the
unauthorized dissemination of personal information by a credit reporting agency causes an injury
in and of itself—whether or not the disclosure of that information increased the risk of identity
theft or some other future harm.”).
240. Id. at 641 (Schwartz, J., concurring) (“Plaintiffs allege[d] that the theft of the laptops
caused a loss of privacy, which is itself an injury in fact.”).
241. E.g., Michael Hopkins, Your Personal Information Was Stolen? That’s an Injury: Article
III Standing in the Context of Data Breaches, 50 U. PAC. L. REV. 427, 445–46 (2019); Lorio, supra
note 23, at 127.
242. Lorio, supra note 23, at 127–28.
243. Relatedly, bailment of intangible property may be a promising theory of harm. However,
courts to date barely address data bailment, other than nothing that “[i]n certain circumstances,
intangible property may be the subject of a bailment.” Richardson v. DSW, Inc., 2005 WL
2978755, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 2005); see also Weitz & Luxenberg, Bailment Claims: A Cause of
Action In Data Breach Cases, WIETZ & LUXENBERG BLOG (Apr. 14, 2015),
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B. Courts Misunderstand Clapper’s Application to Data Breach
Lawsuits
Because of the above delineations of legal harm, Clapper’s
requirement that plaintiffs show that future harm is “imminent” should
not apply to data breach lawsuits; Clapper’s facts and those of data
breach cases markedly differ. A data breach is generally a past and
confirmed event, with victims’ personal information exposed or
acquired.244 On the other hand, Clapper involved allegations of
potential wiretapping by the federal government, which was a
speculative future occurrence.245 Further, the plaintiffs’ claims in
Clapper were based exclusively on those future wiretapping claims
occurring.246 However, none of the plaintiffs had been wiretapped, nor
did any of them have knowledge that the government would ever
wiretap them.247 Rather, the plaintiffs’ allegations were based on a
series of assumptions and contingencies.248 The plaintiffs alleged (1)
that the government planned to imminently target their
communications;249 (2) that the government’s choice to target the
plaintiffs’ communications was pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, as opposed to a different federal power;250 and (3) that
after the government targeted the plaintiffs’ communications, a
separate set of decisionmakers would then actually authorize the
surveillance.251 The Court refused to find that the plaintiffs had
standing because they had merely alleged a “chain of possibilities”

https://www.weitzlux.com/blog/2015/04/14/bailment-claims-cause-action-data-breach-cases/
(discussing a lack of data bailment cases). Even in such a case, plaintiffs still need to allege the
elements of traditional bailment. In re Target Corp. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154,
1177 (D. Minn. 2014) (“Plaintiffs are correct that intangible property such as their personal
financial information can constitute property subject to bailment principles, they have not—and
cannot—allege that they and Target agreed that Target would return the property to them.”). If
data bailment claims’ validity as legitimate claims on the merits are unclear, then so are questions
of standing.
244. Remijas v. Nieman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015).
245. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410–11 (2013).
246. Id. at 402.
247. Id. at 411.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 412. Additionally, whether the government surveilled the plaintiffs pursuant to
Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Act was a question of traceability, not just of whether
there was an injury in fact. Id. at 410–11. That is, the plaintiffs had to show that their alleged
injuries were fairly traceable to the government acting under that specific statute. The plaintiffs
failed to show such traceability. Id.
251. Id. at 413.
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requiring “guesswork as to how independent decisionmakers will
exercise their judgment.”252
A data breach lawsuit is far removed from those facts because the
unauthorized exposure of data already has already occurred; it is not a
speculative or assumed future occurrence.253 Additionally, any
subsequent future harm caused by a data breach, like identity theft or
fraud, stems from and is closely attached to that previous data breach.254
These distinguishing facts alone limit Clapper’s applicability.
Accordingly, Clapper’s requirement that injuries be “certainly
impending” should not control standing for data breach suits. Instead,
courts should, at a minimum, use the lower standard of “substantial
risk” of future harm or, with sufficient facts alleged, use neither and
find that an “actual” injury occurred.
Some circuit courts properly recognize this distinction. The Seventh
Circuit in Remijas noted that in Clapper “there was no evidence that
any of the [plaintiff]s’ communications either had been or would be
monitored.”255 But in a data breach case, there is “no need to speculate”
because information has already been stolen.256 The Ninth Circuit
similarly in Zappos stated that a laptop thief has “all the information
he need[s] to open accounts or spend money in the plaintiffs’ names.”257
In contrast, identifying harm in Clapper had required a “speculative
multi-link chain of inferences.”258 Clapper provides guidance for
analyzing standing but should by no means be used to force imminence
analysis into data breach cases.
C. By Treating Data Breaches as Inherently Injurious, Courts Do Not
Risk Undermining Standing’s Role as a Separation of Powers
Doctrine
Standing is grounded in separation of powers principles, ensuring
that courts rule on only “cases” and “controversies,” rather than
252. Id. at 413–14.
253. E.g., Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“Here, by contrast, an
unauthorized party has already accessed personally identifying data on CareFirst’s servers, and it
is much less speculative—at the very least, it is plausible—to infer that this party has both the
intent and the ability to use that data for ill.”); Remijas v. Nieman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d
688, 692–93 (7th Cir. 2015).
254. Attias, 865 F.3d at 628.
255. Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693 (quoting In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d
1197, 1214 (N.D. Cal. 2014)).
256. Id. (quoting Adobe, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1214).
257. In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 2018).
258. Id.
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creating de facto legislation by ruling on hypothetical situations.259 A
data breach and its fallout are not such hypothetical situations. In a data
breach lawsuit, plaintiffs sue to redress their private legal rights over an
event that has already occurred. It is possible that after a case on the
merits a defendant organization may not be at fault, but to make those
determinations, courts must allow data breach cases to proceed.
Besides, hackers obtain information with the intent to misuse it.260
Whether the breached organization is at fault for that misuse not a
question of standing.261 By finding that data breach plaintiffs have
standing, courts do not risk usurping the power of the legislative or
executive branches.262
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
There are several policy considerations weighing in favor of finding
that data breach plaintiffs have standing in addition from the above
legal analysis. Concluding that a data breach is harmful in and of itself
makes good practical sense.
A. The “Wait and See” Approach Unnecessarily Harms Both
Consumers & Companies
Harm need not have already occurred or be “literally certain” to
constitute an injury in fact.263 Likewise, every data breach victim need
not have already suffered actual identity theft or fraud to suffer a
legally cognizable injury.264 Such a policy benefits plaintiffs by allowing
them to redress their injuries quickly so that future or ongoing harm is
minimized.265 A similar principle applies to why courts grant
preliminary injunctions.266 As soon as a victim’s information is exposed,

259. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 401, 408 (2013).
260. Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693.
261. Zappos, 888 F.3d at 1029.
262. Joslin, supra note 19, at 754 (“Data breach litigation typically takes the form of private
individuals suing to redress their own private rights. In this context, there is no threat of judicial
entanglement in political disputes, nor is there concern about the judiciary usurping political
powers.”).
263. In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1215 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (quoting
Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414 n.5).
264. Id.
265. Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981) (“The purpose of a preliminary
injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can
be held. . . . A party thus is not required to prove his case in full at a preliminary-injunction
hearing.”).
266. See Jeffrey M. Sanchez, The Irreparably Harmed Presumption? Why the Presumption of
Irreparable Harm In Trademark Law Will Survive eBay And Winter, 2011 B.Y.U. L. REV. 535,
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that victim has already suffered an injury in fact. And each day that
victim any other victim must wait to seek redress, they will suffer even
more harm in the form of looming or ongoing misuse of their data.267
In some cases, a portion of plaintiffs have already experienced fraud by
the time they sue, with others expecting data misuse “sooner or
later.”268 From a policy standpoint, customers “should not have to wait
until hackers commit identity theft or credit-card fraud in order to
[have] standing.”269
When plaintiffs ultimately bring suit is a difficult decision. Proving
and winning large money damages may be easier if plaintiffs wait to
sue after a data breach, allowing for more harm to definitively
materialize.270 Meanwhile, the more time that passes between a data
breach and litigation, the more latitude a defendant has to argue a lack
of causation.271 Either way, a plaintiff’s decision of when to sue should
not be made for them by an improper conception of Article III
standing.
Companies may also benefit from earlier data breach lawsuits
because they value certainty in both financial burdens272 and legal
liability.273 If a lawsuit is inevitable, a breached organization, in addition

535 (2011) (“[A] preliminary injunction serves to ‘stop the bleeding’ early on in litigation and can
mitigate potential damage to the trademark owner’s reputation.”); Jim Barr Coleman, Digital
Photography and the Internet, Rethinking Privacy Law, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 205, 214 (2005)
(“Traditionally, the purpose of a preliminary injunction is that you stop the bleeding.”).
267. Remijas v. Nieman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 694 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-737: REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS:
PERSONAL INFORMATION 29 (2007)), https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07737.pdf) (“Further,
once stolen data have been sold or posted on the Web, fraudulent use of that information my
continue for years.”).
268. Id. at 693–94.
269. Id. at 693.
270. Id.
271. Id. (quoting In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1215 n.5 (N.D. Cal.
2014)).
272. See, e.g., Will Kenton, Certainty Equivalent Definition, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/certaintyequivalent.asp (last updated Apr. 21, 2019)
(“Investments must pay a risk premium to compensate investors for the possibility that they may
not get their money back and the higher the risk, the higher premium an investor expects over
the average return. . . . A company seeking investors can use the certainty equivalent as a basis
for determining how much more it needs to pay to convince investors to consider the riskier
option.”).
273. See, e.g., John R. Allison, Five Ways to Keep Disputes Out of Court ¶ 1, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Feb. 1990), https://hbr.org/1990/01/five-ways-to-keep-disputes-out-of-court (“[T]here are few
things managers dread more than litigation. Even petty cases have a way of damaging
relationships, tarnishing reputations, and eating up enormous sums of money, time, and talent.”);
Thomas H. Belknap Jr., Calculating Settlement Value of a Case ¶ 1, BLANK ROME LLP (Apr.
2014), https://www.blankrome.com/publications/calculating-settlement-value-case-0.
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to trying to avoid substantial monetary liability, may want to resolve
the lawsuit as soon as possible.274 For that reason in particular,
companies may value forcing plaintiffs into arbitration.275 Or if
arbitration is not possible, companies may prefer federal class actions
because they can resolve every claim in a single action, even when the
litigation presents a risk of sweeping adverse outcomes.276 By no means
do all companies necessarily agree. “For corporate interests, class
actions are often viewed as a two-edged sword, offering enormous risks
and tremendous opportunities to resolve outstanding litigation issues
in one fell swoop.”277 But denying standing to data breach plaintiffs
prevents this route altogether by forcing plaintiffs to postpone lawsuits,
leaving companies guessing as to when they will finally be served.
B. Federal Class Actions Are More Efficient Than State Suits
Granting standing to plaintiffs in data breach cases will not burden
companies with lawsuits any more than they otherwise would face.
Even if plaintiffs had immense difficulty proving standing, they would
likely still bring federal suits, just later, once more harm materialized.
Although plaintiffs can always bring data breach suits in state courts,
where the plaintiffs would likely more easily have standing,278 it seems
likely that plaintiffs would continue in federal courts. In federal courts,
plaintiffs may take advantage of the plaintiff-friendly Class Action
Fairness Act (“CAFA”),279 multi-district litigation (“MDL”) that
allows plaintiffs to consolidate cases nationally,280 and federal statutes
like FCRA. Moreover, plaintiffs in federal court can still bring state law

274. See David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have and Plaintiffs
Don’t, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 430 (2000) (“[D]efendant firms are structured to operate risk
neutrally and have many means of hedging against risk, notably derived from laws limiting
liability and affording protection in bankruptcy, opportunities for stockholders to diversify their
portfolios, and widespread availability of liability insurance.”).
275. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the
Deck of Justice ¶¶ 1–3, N.Y. TIMES (Oc. 21, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/
dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html
(discussing
arbitration
clauses as a method for companies to circumvent the court system).
276. James M. Underwood, Rationality, Multiplicity & Legitimacy: Federalization of the
Interstate Class Action, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 391, 403 (2004).
277. Id.
278. Willis, supra note 158, at 253–54 (citing state court cases from Michigan, Alaska,
California, New Jersey).
279. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), Pub. L. 109-2 (2005).
280. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2018) (laying out “multidistrict litigation” standards).
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claims, like the powerful California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”)281
under diversity jurisdiction.282
Finding that data breach plaintiffs have standing will also be
unlikely to increase companies’ litigation burdens because the many
tools at federal courts’ disposal increase judicial efficiency. Through
economies of scale in class action suits, defendants can amalgamate
evidence; and plaintiffs no longer need to bring scattered and distinct
state suits.283 Although state court systems wield their own class action
statutes,284 federal courts are likely more efficient for plaintiffs and
defendants alike to adjudicate national data breach incidents.
C. Consumers as “Private Attorneys General” Help Create Proper
Corporate Cybersecurity
The more likely it is that a company will face legal liability following
a data breach, the more incentivized that company will be to adopt
robust cybersecurity practices.285 Finding that plaintiffs have standing
in data breach cases will increase the ease at which victims can bring
suits, and companies will in turn invest in privacy infrastructure to deter
and prevent would-be hackers.286 Companies already have compelling

281. Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.100 (West 2020).
282. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2018).
283. See David Rosenberg, supra note 274, at 394 (“With class-wide aggregation of the
defense interest, the defendant exploits economies of scale to invest far more cost-effectively in
preparing its side of the case than plaintiffs can in preparing their side.”).
284. E.g., Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220 (1993).
285. Although deterrence is often discussed in terms of how damages should be calculated
and imposed, the deterrent effects of more permissively letting suits proceed with standing should
have a similar effect, as if damages for civil liability were increased. See John C. Manning, Going
Back to Scrap in Order to Refine Steel: The Supreme Court Loosens the Modern Constraints on
the Doctrine of Standing in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC),
Inc., 10 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 215, 230–31 (2001) (discussing that “an award of civil penalties . . .
would prevent the defendant’s conduct through deterrence”); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Sharon
L. Davies, The Empire Strikes Back: A Critique of the Backlash Against Fraud and Abuse
Enforcement, 51 ALA. L. REV. 239, 266 (1999) (“In tort cases, it has been argued that damages
should normally be calibrated to achieve what is referred to as ‘optimal deterrence,’ i.e., damages
should be set sufficiently high to ensure that a tortfeasor fully internalizes all the costs that her
conduct imposes on a victim . . . .”).
286. The idea of deterrence through threat of liability is exemplified in antitrust law, in which
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2018), allows private plaintiffs to collect treble damages,
thereby incentivizing private citizens to zealously sue companies for antitrust violations. See Ill.
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745–46 (1977) (discussing the legislative intent behind treble
damages to be enforcement by “private attorneys general”); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 484 (1968) (“Treble-damage actions, the importance of which the
Court has many times emphasized . . . .”); Jason Wasserman, Apple v. Pepper: Applying the
Indirect Purchaser Rule to Online Platforms, 14 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 147,
153 (2019) (quoting Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 746) (“In large part, the rule was created to
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reasons to protect their data. Data breach litigation costs companies
millions of dollars in legal expenses, computer system rehabilitation
costs, and bad press.287 But finding that plaintiffs have standing will
provide an even greater incentive to improve cybersecurity practices
without coercion.288 Compromised organizations, often corporations,
are also least-cost avoiders289 for improving privacy infrastructure in
the United States. If and when companies do ultimately adopt strong
cybersecurity practices, the companies should in theory be
compromised less often.
CONCLUSION
Cyberattacks and subsequent data breaches increase every year,
depriving individuals control of their personal information. Whether it
is the breached company’s fault, or solely the fault of the hacker,
depends on the merits of each case, and plaintiffs should be able to
bring lawsuits against breached organizations swiftly and reliably to
resolve those questions. Some courts, however, have wrongly found that
data breach victims do not have standing because the future harm
caused by a data breach is too “speculative.” But the exposure of
information from a data breach is an injury in and of itself. Courts
should find that victims of data breaches suffer injuries in fact sufficient
for standing the moment that their information is disclosed without
their consent. Doing so will reinforce common law rights, efficiently
resolve liability, and better protect consumers.

incentivize private antitrust actions by direct purchasers, or so-called ‘private attorneys
general.’”).
BLOG,
287. What’s
the
Real
Cost
of
a
Data
Breach?,
PKWARE
https://www.pkware.com/blog/what-s-the-real-cost-of-a-data-breach (last updated Sept. 2019).
288. See Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. v. DeVries, 139 S. Ct. 986, 997 n.3 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Riggs Nat’l Bank of Washington,
D.C., 5. F.3d 554, 557 (D.C. Cir. 1993)) (“‘Placing liability with the least-cost avoider increases
the incentive for that party to adopt preventive measures’ that will ‘have the greatest marginal
effect on preventing the loss.’”).
289. See Alan Butler, Products Liability and the Internet of (Insecure) Things: Should
Manufacturers Be Liable for Damage Caused By Hacked Devices?, 50 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 913,
916 (2017) (“[H]olding manufacturers liable for downstream harms caused by their insecure
devices is well aligned with the purposes of products liability law—to minimize harm by
encouraging manufacturers (as a least-cost-avoider) to invest in security measures.” (emphasis
added)); Guido Calabresi, Civil Recourse Theory’s Reductionism, 88 IND. L.J. 449, 456–57 (2013)
(discussing how the “first party” in an accident is often the “least-cost-avoider/best decider”).

